What drives interest group collaboration at the EU level? Evidence from the European environmental interest groups by Ruth Webster
 
What drives interest group collaboration at the EU level? Evidence from the
European environmental interest groups 
Ruth Webster 
European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 4 (2000) N°17; 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-017a.htm
Date of publication in the  : 21.12.2000 
| Full text | Back to homepage | PDF | 
| This paper's comments page | Send your comment! to this paper |
Keywords
environmental policy, institutions, institutionalism, interest representation, lobbying, NGOs,
political science 
Abstract
The paper examines patterns of interest group collaboration at the EU level and investigates factors
with the potential to influence collaborative behaviour. Ideas from the literature on collective
action, interest group coalitions, American and European interest representation and new
institutionalism create a framework for analysing the range of collaborative fora at the EU level and
the factors driving collaboration among groups seeking to shape EU public policies. Empirical
evidence drawn from a case study of collaboration by European environmental interest groups
presents a number of conclusions about the nature of and reasons for collaboration. The European
environmental interest groups favour informally organised, flexible coalitions in which the
members decide their level of participation. The case study identifies collective and selective
incentives, issues and allies (coalition partners) as factors driving collaborative behaviour. The case
study also demonstrates the importance of considering the potential influence of opposition actors
and the EU institutional framework on interest group collaboration. 
Kurzfassung
Dieser Artikel untersucht Muster der Zusammenarbeit von Interessensgruppen auf EU-Ebene und
erforscht potentielle Einflußfaktoren für das kooperative Verhalten. Ideen aus der Literatur zu
collective action, Interessensgruppenkoalitionen, amerikanischer und europäischer
Interessensvertretung und neuem Institutionalismus bilden den Rahmen für die Analyse der
verschiedenen Foren der Zusammenarbeit auf EU-Ebene sowie der Faktoren, die die
Zusammenarbeit zwischen Gruppen befördern, die das Ziel haben, die öffentliche EU-Politik zu
beeinflussen. Empirische Belege aus einer Fallstudie zur Zusammenarbeit von europäischen
Umweltgruppen führen zu einer Reihe von Schlußfolgerungen über die Natur und die Gründe für
Zusammenarbeit. Die europäischen Umweltgruppen bevorzugen informell organisierte, flexible
Koalitionen, in denen die Mitglieder ihr Beteiligungsniveau selbst festlegen. Die Fallstudie
identifiziert kollektive und selektive Anreize, Themen und Alliierte (Koalitionspartner) als
kooperationsfördernde Faktoren. Die Fallstudie zeigt weiters die Wichtigkeit des potentiellen
Einflusses von Akteuren der Gegenseite sowie des institutionellen EU-Rahmens auf die
Zusammenarbeit von Interessensgruppen auf. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on European Union (EU) level interest representation leaves relatively few stones
unturned. Theoretical and empirical accounts explain inter alia the volume and range of groups
operating at the trans-national level, how they are created and maintained, their importance for the
optimal functioning of the EU political system (particularly regarding routine policy making
decisions), and their contribution to the integration process. However, one area which has received
little attention to date is the patterns of associability that develop between interest groups. Groups
operating at the EU level do not work in isolation. They are aware of their contemporaries. More than
this, groups communicate with each other. Interaction may lead to various outcomes, including the
ubiquitous exchange of information. The collective pursuit of shared public policy goals is another
possible outcome and serves as the focus of this paper. 
The paper seeks to investigate patterns of interest group collaboration at the EU level and identify
factors driving collaboration. It presents ideas from the literature on interest group coalitions,
collective action, American and European interest representation and new institutionalism to create a
framework for examining both the range of collaborative fora and the factors influencing the
collaborative behaviour of groups seeking to shape EU public policies. Empirical evidence drawn
from a case study of collaboration involving European level environmental interest groups presents a
number of conclusions about the nature of and reasons for collaboration. 
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in Brussels and Europe-wide organisations keen to influence the EU policy process. These groups are
ideal candidates for an investigation of interest group collaboration because of their collaborative
record. It is well known that the Brussels-based environmental groups collaborate (see for instance
Biliouri, 1999; Long 1998, 1995; Mazey and Richardson 1993; Webster 1998). The main forum
through which the groups have sought joint action for issues of common interest has varied according
to the number of groups involved - the original Group of Four expanded to the Group of Seven and
more recently the Group of Eight (G-8).(1) The enduring existence of this forum lends credence to an
assumption which underpins the paper, namely that prima facie the potential for collaboration among
the European environmental groups is considerable because they are not subject to the profit and
market share tensions that underpin relations between many business and industry interest groups.
Instead, the environmental groups share a common goal of protecting the environment. This provides
a solid basis from which to act in concert. The literature and empirical evidence test these
assumptions in the following sections. 
2
Although European environmental interest groups are the focus of the paper, patterns of
collaboration (where the outcome is joint action to achieve shared public policy goals) is common
among private and public interests at the EU level but to varying degrees and configurations. For
example, the Packaging Chain Forum brought together industry associations in a coalition to address
the European directive on packaging and packaging waste (European Communities, 1994; Porter and
Butt Philip, 1993). The EU level consumer interest groups form ad hoc alliances as well as "highly
developed and institutionalised" (Young, 1998, pp.166-167) patterns of collaboration on issues
relating to agriculture, foodstuffs and technical standardisation (Young, 1998, p.166). Consequently,
some of the factors driving collaboration between the European environmental interest groups have a
more general application to collaborating interests at the EU level. 
The paper begins with a definition of interest group collaboration and a discussion of basic criteria to
identify the main patterns. The ideas drawn from the literature build a framework for investigating a
range of factors with the potential to influence the collaborative behaviour of the European
environmental interest groups. Case study evidence is used to explore these factors to reveal the
collaborative activities of the European environmental interest groups and explain their behaviour. 
2. Patterns of interest group collaboration 
The definition adopted throughout the paper emphasises the purpose of collaboration, namely the
furtherance of common interests. In essence, interest groups act in concert to achieve shared public
policy goals. This definition draws upon Olson’s (1971 edition) definition of collective action and
Hula’s (1995) definition of political coalitions. Both authors emphasise the purpose of collaboration.
For Olson (1971 edition) the collective action problem arises because individuals with common
interests will not act collectively to realise them. Consequently, the pursuit of common or group
interests is the reason for collective action. Hula perceives political coalitions as “groups of
organizations united by a common political goal” (1995, p.240). Again, the intention of the coalition
is clear. Given its purpose, the paper regards collaboration as a strategy for influencing the EU policy
process. Furthermore, the paper regards interest groups as rational actors in the sense that they choose
the strategy they consider the most appropriate to achieve their public policy goals. The decision to
treat interest groups as rational actors is deliberate and influenced by the collective action literature.
The discussion of the literary framework in section three considers this decision in detail. 
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participate in a range of fora. The paper adopts “coalition” as the generic term to describe the various
fora in which groups combine forces. Existing studies of interest group coalitions in the American
(Washington) policy process refer to their longevity, breadth of concern, structural characteristics and
membership. These criteria have universal applicability and transfer readily to the EU. 
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Loomis (1986) identifies the first two defining characteristics, namely the duration of the coalition
and the number of issues it addresses. He describes four types of interest group coalition: the AD
HOC CAUSE coalition forms around a particular issue and is a short-term venture; the AD HOC
COMPLEX coalition organises around multiple issues for a similarly limited period; the CAUSE
coalition champions one issue over a long period; and the COMPLEX coalition focuses on many
issues and is a long-term alliance (1986, p.262). Schlozman and Tierney (1986) add the remaining
structural and membership criteria. Coalitions differ according to their internal organisational
structure, be it formal or informal. Schlozman and Tierney mention the extent to which meetings are
planned and members are asked for contributions as indicators of formally organised coalitions
(1986, p.48). The presence of a secretariat (staff) to manage and maintain the interest group coalition
is a further indicator of a formal internal structure. The membership composition of coalitions is the
fourth criterion. Whereas the members of some coalitions come from the same interest group
category, a more heterogeneous mix comprises the membership of other coalitions (Schlozman and
Tierney, 1986, p.48). 
Research on coalitions within the American interest group system reveals the prevalence of
short-term, single-issue coalitions (or AD HOC CAUSE coalitions in Loomis’ (1986) terminology).
These coalitions are attractive because they are flexible (Berry, 1989, p.166). They do not commit
members for an indefinite period; neither do they extend their scope beyond a specific issue.
Moreover, the limited duration of a temporary coalition enables interest groups to concentrate finite
resources on other priority matters (Berry, 1989, p.167). Regarding membership Berry (1989, p.168)
notes that most coalitions bring together groups who already consider themselves allies. Invariably
this means groups operating within the same policy areas where shared interests are identified
readily. Repeated collaboration fosters a communication and trust advantage for groups that maintain
collaborative links (Berry, 1989, p.168). 
Nevertheless, this advantage is not a prerequisite for collaboration. Coalitions comprising interest
groups from many policy areas are commonplace in Washington and emerge in response to issues
that affect simultaneously numerous interests. This can lead to some unlikely alliances of groups who
may consider their routine interactions to be more adversarial than collaborative. Examining
collaboration between the European environmental movement and other political actors Dalton
(1992) contends that short-term, issue-specific collaboration between environmental groups and
others is the norm. Hence, public policy issues create interim alliances between enduring enemies,
including environmental groups and industry. Berry (1989) and Schlozman and Tierney (1986)
regard the issue as the collaborative glue particularly for heterogeneous coalitions. Without a
common issue, unlikely alliances often become unstuck. However, successful unlikely partnerships
may endure (Berry, 1989, p.169) and enjoy the trust and friendship advantages of more homogeneous
coalitions. 
4
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coalitions within the American system (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986, p. 48). It is easy to link this to
the longevity and issue scope (or breadth of concern) criteria. Indeed, the prevalence of temporary,
single-issue coalitions points towards informality because the limited time-scale and issue scope
militates against the establishment of a secretariat or membership scheme. This type of organisational
structure is neither universal for, nor exclusive to, fleeting, one-issue coalitions. The G-8 is a
pertinent, EU example of an enduring, multi-issue interest group coalition organised on an informal
basis. There is no secretariat, membership subscription or formal record of meetings and
communications between the Brussels-based environmental groups. Moreover, it is the prerogative of
each environmental interest group member to decide whether to act on a particular issue.(2) 
Although interest group collaboration is an everyday phenomenon among interest groups seeking to
influence the American policy process Berry (1989) strikes a cautionary note. Coalition formation is
not a foregone conclusion. Groups work alone because there is a shortage of potential coalition
partners, or groups prefer to pursue some public policy issues on an individual basis, namely those
issues they deem to be most important (Berry, 1989, pp. 165-166). Whereas interest groups act alone
on priority issues, they collaborate on issues of secondary importance. Coalitions provide groups
with an opportunity to pursue issues that they would not address by themselves (Berry, 1989, p.166).
The literature presented in the following section investigates these points. 
As noted above, the purpose of interest group collaboration is essential to its definition. In turn, the
purpose of collaboration provides a plausible answer to the question ‘what drives collaboration?’.
Interest groups collaborate to achieve common public policy goals. Yet, some of the ideas presented
in the literary framework question the simplicity of this answer. Indeed, some strands within the
collective action literature doubt the commitment of coalition members to achieving public policy
goals. 
3. Incentives, allies, issues, opposition and institutions – factors
with the potential to drive collaborative behaviour 
While the desire to achieve shared public policy goals is a plausible answer to the question ‘what
drives collaboration?’ the literary framework includes ideas that look beyond common interests as an
explanation for collaborative behaviour. The collective action literature is the starting point for an
examination of the factors driving interest group collaboration and accentuates the role of incentives. 
5
With the publication of The Logic of Collective Action in 1965, Olson (1971 edition) advanced an
economic explanation for collective action which emphasised how difficult it is to encourage
individuals to act collectively to realise common (group) interests. His interpretation of the nature of
common interests and rational choice perspective support this statement. Group interests usually take
the form of collective goods. Collective goods are non-excludable, therefore their supply cannot be
restricted to those who secure their provision. Everyone within a designated group will benefit from
the collective good regardless of their individual contribution. Regarding the rational choice
perspective, Olson (1971 edition) considers individuals as self-interested actors whose behaviour
reflects their desire to maximise personal utility.(3) Combining these elements Olson (1971 edition)
states that rational, self-interested individuals will not act collectively to achieve common interests
(in the shape of collective goods) because the cost of contributing exceeds the collective,
non-excludable benefit. Utility-maximising individuals will wait for others to contribute and free-ride
based on their input. Put simply, why should an individual pay for a good he/she will receive
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pursue collective goods: “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is
coercion or some other special device” (Olson, 1971 edition, p.2) individuals will not engage in
collective action to pursue their common interests. 
Incentives, more particularly selective incentives, are the special device to resolve the collective
action dilemma. Selective incentives are separate exclusive goods available only to group members.
When presented as a positive inducement selective incentives transform the cost-benefit calculus of
the rational actor. Groups elicit contributions from utility maximising individuals if the benefits from
membership exceed the costs. Invariably membership benefits outweigh the costs when selective,
excludable inducements are available. Olson (1971 edition) addresses the idea of different types of
selective incentive, including psychological and moral selective incentives. However, he chooses to
exclude them from the theory. One of the reasons given is the inability to test empirically these types
of incentives (Olson, 1971 edition, p.61n17). Consequently, he focuses on material (economic) and
social (non-economic) selective incentives. Social selective incentives (such as status and prestige)
are more appropriate for small and intermediate groups. Material selective incentives are more
appropriate for large groups. Olson (1971 edition) concentrates on large economic groups, therefore
the emphasis is on material selective incentives. By providing this type of excludable inducement,
large economic groups can mobilise. Selective incentives reduce the likelihood of free-riding and
eliminate the collective action problem. Olson (1971 edition) reinforces the importance of selective
incentives with the by-product theory. 
The Logic of Collective Action (Olson, 1971 edition) remains a turning point in the study of group
mobilisation. Olson’s (1971 edition) theory continues to stimulate debate about the influences upon
individuals to realise their common interests. Yet, Olson’s (1971 edition) contribution is a less than
perfect match for many groups whose individual members appear to mobilise ostensibly to pursue
collective goods, and tangible (material) selective incentives are anything but ubiquitous. Public
interest groups fall into this category. Hence, “There is then a mobilization paradox: Olson’s theory
predicts the under mobilization of public interest groups but this seems contradicted by their
empirical proliferation” (Jordan and Maloney, 1996, p.669). Olson (1971 edition) sets clear
parameters for his theory. It seeks to explain the collective action problems facing large economic
groups based on the rational, (largely) self-interested behaviour of individuals. Successive additions
to the collective action literature extend the definition of rational behaviour and the range of
incentives that induce collective action, not least in contributing to an understanding of why so many
individuals join organisations which represent inter alia human rights and civil liberties,
environmental protection and animal welfare (see for example, Jordan and Maloney, 1997, 1996). 
6
Individuals behave rationally when they act to realise their preferences (Moe, 1980; Salisbury, 1969).
However, their preferences may amount to something other than maximising personal utility. Some
contributions to the literature are critical of economic explanations for collective action and advance
instead a broader set of preferences on which rational individuals act. Preferences and actions are
subject to many influences, including the social ties and attachments individuals have to each other
(Knoke, 1988; Udehn, 1993), the value system and moral sense of each individual (Moe, 1980;
Udehn, 1993), the experiences each individual brings to new situations, and the information and
skills available to each individual (Moe, 1980). 
Regarding selective incentives, the literature identifies material, solidary and purposive (or
expressive) types (Clark and Wilson, 1961; Salisbury, 1969). In addition to benefits that have a
material value, individuals may receive social rewards from acting collectively. The
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with a sense of satisfaction from contributing to the cause or the opportunity to articulate their views
and beliefs. Purposive incentives may also be collective because they relate to the common interests
of the group. Jordan and Maloney (1996, pp.678-679) discovered that the members of Friends of the
Earth rank the campaigning activities of the environmental organisation above any services available
exclusively to those who join. Consequently, the public policy goals of the environmental interest
group can persuade individuals to become members. These individuals are rational actors whose
preferences are for something other than the maximisation of personal utility. 
Criticism of Olson’s (1971 edition) narrow economic definition of rational behaviour has drawn
attention to myriad potential influences upon the preferences and actions of individuals. This in turn
points the investigation of why the European environmental interest groups collaborate in a number
of directions. Collaboration does not present the environmental interest groups with the same
problem facing Olson’s (1971 edition) individuals. After all the environmental groups pursue
collective goods as a matter of routine. Moreover, collaboration is a strategic option to achieve public
policy goals and as such the participants are making “second-tier choices” (Gray and Lowery, 1997,
p.322; Jordan, 1998). The issue at stake for the European environmental interest groups is how they
should pursue a public policy goal, not whether they should pursue it. Mindful of this, rational action
based upon the desire to maximise personal utility is less appropriate for the European environmental
groups than for the economically driven individuals in Olson’s (1971 edition) theory. However, by
changing the unit of analysis from the individual to the group as well as the types of incentive
available to collaborating groups, Hula (1999, 1995) illustrates the importance of including
incentives in a discussion of the factors influencing collaboration. Indeed, Hula’s (1999, 1995)
research reveals how incentives influence the way in which groups collaborate as well as why they
collaborate. 
Hula (1999, 1995) identifies strategic, policy-oriented incentives and selective incentives to attract
potential coalition partners. Coalition participants seeking to influence public policies respond to the
former policy-oriented category. They perceive collaborative strategies as “the most effective way to
shape policy outcomes” (Hula, 1995, p.241). Coalitions also offer selective benefits, notably
information. This exclusive incentive is particularly attractive to groups that have joined for reasons
other than the achievement of public policy goals (that is, strategic, policy-oriented incentives) (Hula,
1995, p.246). Symbolic benefits are a further type of excludable incentive available only to coalition
members. Hula suggests that the commitment of some groups to coalitions is largely symbolic – a
measure to satisfy their members (be they individuals or organisations) that they are actively
representing their interests in Washington, or provide support for other groups (1995, pp.248-249). In
other words, joining a coalition demonstrates how busy the interest group is on behalf of its
members, or shows allegiance to other organisations.(4) 
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In changing the unit of analysis from the individual to the group, Hula (1999, 1995) identifies an
important methodological point, namely that the usual participants in interest group coalitions are the
members of staff employed by the groups. Members of staff differ from individual group members
because collaborating to secure public policy goals brings a particular set of exclusive benefits to
employees, notably a reduction in their workload from sharing tasks with other groups as well as
improving the group’s chances of success by choosing this strategy to influence the policy process
(Hula, 1995, p.242). Collaboration is consistent with the rational behaviour of paid employees. 
Hula’s (1999, 1995) research raises two points about interest group coalitions and the incentives to
which they respond. First, interest groups respond to public policy goals (collective goods) because
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achieving political goals but also as a means for shaping the coalition’s platform according to their
specific interests and, in a broader context, influencing the terms of the policy debate (Hula, 1995,
p.244). Second, individual group members and interest group employees respond to different types of
selective incentives. For example, resource saving and sharing is a widely recognised benefit from
collaboration (Baggott, 1995; Berry, 1989; Schlozman and Tierney, 1986). 
Turning to the manner in which incentives influence how interest groups collaborate, Hula (1999,
1995) identifies different categories of membership – core members, specialist members and
peripheral members (Hula, 1995, pp.249-255). Members within the first category display the highest
level of commitment to the achievement of public policy goals (collective incentives). These groups
bear the start-up costs to enable the coalition to pursue collective goods in the shape of favourable
policy outputs (Hula, 1995, p.250). Surrounding the core members are the specialists or players
(Hula, 1995, p.250). These groups are also keen to pursue policy goals and bring knowledge and
expertise to the coalition. Their objectives are more limited than those of core members because they
tend to concentrate on particular aspects of policy. If the coalition fails to incorporate or reflect their
views, specialist members may leave (Hula, 1995, p.253). Specialists respond to collective incentives
and more particularly the opportunity to mould the policy goals of the coalition. Peripheral groups
are less interested in collective incentives than the other members and take a less active role in the
coalition. They respond to selective incentives (Hula, 1995, p.254). Despite their relative inactivity,
these members can have a significant impact upon the success of a coalition: even if an influential
group only lends its passive support, its name may contribute to the overall success of the coalition
(Hula, 1995, p.254). Drawing distinctions between coalition members highlights the potential
influence of selective as well as collective incentives upon collaborative behaviour. 
Moving beyond the discussion of incentives, the literary framework includes a range of ideas to
investigate additional factors with the potential to influence collaborative behaviour, namely the
relationships between potential coalition partners, public policy issues, the presence of opposition
actors, and the institutional framework. 
8
Interest groups tend to have “some reliable coalition partners” (Berry, 1989, p.168) with which they
develop a bond through repeated collaboration. Although allies are often identified initially within
the same policy sector more unusual partnerships can flourish in the long-term (see section two
above). Focusing on the European environmental groups we might assume that co-operation between
environmental organisations “of the kind that is necessary to be influential in Europe should be
relatively easy to achieve, at least in principle” (Long, 1998, p.117), not least because organisations
strive for a common fundamental goal to protect the environment. A shared fundamental goal and
understanding of environmental concerns should enable these like-minded groups to collaborate. 
Experience adds to the opportunities for interest group collaboration. Groups with a collaborative
history are aware of the expertise and commitment others will offer to a coalition: “Repeated
experience with other organizations introduces more stability into the relationship and provides for
enhanced trust between members of the alliance” (Hojnacki, 1997, p.68). Examining the impact of
collaborative experience on coalition formation, Hojnacki (1997) tests the proposition that
experience can influence a group’s decision to collaborate in the future. An experienced group is
more likely to harbour realistic expectations vis-à-vis its role within a coalition and what the
coalition can hope to achieve. As a practised coalition ally, the group knows what to expect from
others and what others will expect of it. Hojnacki’s findings confirm the proposition that groups
which collaborate frequently (that is, groups for which collaboration is the strategy selected for at
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which engage in collective action less frequently (1997, p.82). However, the results also reveal that
collaborative experience is one of several factors influencing collaborative behaviour (Hojnacki,
1997, p.82). 
Coalitions emerge around issues, as do potential coalition members. Berry suggests that groups tend
to work individually on issues of great importance to their interests and collaborate on issues they
would not normally address by themselves (1989, p.166). Nevertheless, some issues demand a
collaborative response because of their complex nature (Loomis, 1986). Loomis (1986, p.268) cites
nuclear power, tax laws and acid rain as examples. Complex issues often lead to coalitions of
unlikely allies. They also provide interest coalitions with the opportunity to affect the level of public
attention such issues receive (Loomis, 1986, p.267). For example, interest group coalitions can
“broaden the scope of the conflict” (Loomis, 1986, p.268) by disseminating clear, concise
information to improve knowledge and understanding, and attract attention (of both the public and
the policy-makers). Loomis argues that environmental interest groups are successful when they try to
increase public awareness (1986, p.268). 
Hojnacki (1997) investigates how perceptions of an organised opposition can influence the decision
to collaborate. Essentially, “When opponents are strong, organizations will see greater benefits in
joining a coalition with other groups” (Hojnacki, 1997, pp.84-85). Groups will be more amenable to
collaboration if they perceive a strong organised opposition because “Alliances provide a means of
showing broader support for a cause or interest” (Hojnacki, 1997, p.67). In other words, there is
safety and strength in numbers. 
9
In addition to perceptions of opposition actors, relations between interest groups and the institutional
framework of the EU may drive collaborative behaviour. Ideas from the literature on new
institutionalism identify ways in which the EU institutions can influence interest group behaviour.
This literature considers and debates the manner in which institutions “structure political interactions
and in this way affect political outcomes” (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.13). In essence, new
institutionalism assumes that “institutions matter” (Bulmer, 1993, p.355). Views differ as to how
institutions shape political interactions and outcomes. For historical institutionalists “institutions are
not just another variable” (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.9), they affect the preferences as well as the
strategies of actors. By contrast, rational choice institutionalists credit institutions with the power to
influence only the strategies selected by actors (thus restricting explanations to how actors behave not
why they behave). It is unnecessary to choose a side (be it the historical, sociological or rational
choice school) when applying the new institutionalist approach in the paper because examining the
extent to which institutions influence the behaviour of interest groups is not critical to the analysis.
The decision to collaborate is a decision about how to pursue preferences not how preferences form.
For the purposes of this investigation the new institutionalist approach confirms the importance of
looking at the institutional landscape and the way in which interest groups relate to it. This includes
their patterns of interaction over the policy issues they pursue and the political goals they seek to
achieve. Without knowing the extent to which “institutions matter” (Bulmer, 1993, p.355) it is
possible to examine how the EU institutions influence the behaviour of the environmental interest
groups. 
There is considerable scope for analysis by adopting an inclusive (historical institutionalist)
definition of institutions. Bulmer defines institutions “as meaning formal institutions; informal
institutions and conventions; the norms and symbols embedded in them; and policy instruments and
procedures” (1998, p.370). Bulmer (1998) identifies several ways in which the EU institutions can
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supranational institutions are not neutral actors mediating the preferences and demands of others
(including member states and interest groups) (1998, p.374). The formal supranational institutions
have their own agendas and shape the policy process accordingly. For example, the institutions act as
gatekeepers allowing only some groups the opportunity to influence the policy process (Bulmer,
1998, p.374). Secondly, these formal supranational institutions can act as “key players in their own
right” (Bulmer, 1998, p.374). The European Commission’s agenda-setting role exemplifies the way
in which the supranational institutions can shape the policy process. 
Walker’s (1991) examination of the role of institutional patronage in the formation and maintenance
of interest groups within the American political system identifies the potential for the direct
involvement of the institutions upon collaborative behaviour. The literature acknowledges the
financial assistance provided by the European Commission to public interest groups in particular.
However, it is not known whether institutional patrons support the collaborative fora in which
interest groups, particularly the European environmental groups, participate or how such assistance
might influence the behaviour of these participants and the patterns of collaboration that emerge. 
10
In sum, the literary framework guiding the empirical investigation presents the European
environmental interest groups as rational actors - rational in the sense that they act to realise their
preferences. Unlike the utility maximising preferences of the individuals in Olson’s (1971 edition)
theory of collective action, preferences of the European environmental interest groups might be
subject to a range of influences. Regarding the range of influences upon the preferences of the
European environmental interest groups, the literary framework mentions some potential factors that
are difficult to investigate without recourse to other academic disciplines, including moral
sensibilities, value systems and societal norms and conventions. While accepting the importance of
such factors the literary framework focuses on actions rather than preference formation and upon
those factors that can be examined within the scope of the investigation. Hence, the empirical
investigation concentrates on the potential of collective and selective incentives, coalition partners
(or allies), public policy issues, and opposition interest and institutional actors as factors driving
interest group collaboration. 
Based on existing research, it is anticipated that the role of collective and selective incentives will
prove to be an important influence upon the collaborative behaviour of the European environmental
groups. Environmental groups seek to achieve public policy goals as a matter of routine. Hence, the
strategic benefits from collaborating may persuade groups to create and participate in coalitions. As
rational actors, the European environmental groups act to realise their policy ambitions and select
strategies accordingly. The groups are not oblivious to their operational environment. Consequently,
it is anticipated that a range of factors, including the actions of groups with opposing views on a
particular public policy issue and the EU institutions might influence their behaviour. 
4. Patterns of collaboration involving the European
environmental interest groups: case study evidence 
A case study of collaboration involving several European environmental interest groups investigates
how these organisations collaborate and what drives their collaborative behaviour.(5) The case study
investigates collaboration over the European Parliament and Council Decision 1692/96/EC of 23
July 1996 on Community guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network
(European Communities, 1996). This legislative instrument comprises several elements, including
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network, the Community measures necessary to construct the TEN-T and the criteria for identifying
infrastructure projects which contribute to the development of the TEN-T. In other words, Decision
1692/96/EC (European Communities, 1996) sets out the dimensions of and requirements for a
European transport infrastructure system which links existing national networks and connects the
peripheral regions to the EU’s core, thereby transforming the patchwork of national networks into a
common trans-European infrastructure. The Commission believes that, once in place, TEN-T will
stimulate job creation, provide the necessary transport infrastructure to support the single market,
reduce traffic congestion, increase choice for the consumer and contribute to a cleaner environment
(Commission of the European Communities, 1995, pp.12-14). The latter benefit anticipated by the
Commission interested the European environmental groups in particular. 
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This case study is part of a larger project during which cases were selected following preliminary
research on several issue areas (chemicals, biotechnology, waste management and transport) where
patterns of interest group collaboration was anticipated. The preliminary research identified several
transport related issues that met the selection criteria, namely that issues should have a clear
environmental dimension and involve a range of private and public interest groups. The latter
criterion sought to maximise the potential for collaboration and competition between groups. The
TEN-T has major environmental implications vis-à-vis land use, wildlife and natural habitats, and
noise and air pollution. Hence, its attraction to environmental interests is clear. Similarly, the
economic implications of a Europe-wide transport infrastructure attract the attention of business and
industry interests. In contrast to the other case in the project, the TEN-T is a relatively new,
post-Maastricht issue and involves a strong Member State dimension.(6) 
Six European environmental interest groups engaged in collaborative action to improve the
environmental protection provisions within the legislative guidelines for the development of the
TEN-T: Action for Solidarity, Equality, Environment and Development Europe (A SEED Europe),
BirdLife International, Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), Greenpeace (Austria and Switzerland),
European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E), and Worldwide Fund for Nature
(WWF). They referred to their collaborative effort as Trans European Networks and NGOs or
TENGO. 
The members of the TENGO coalition questioned the economic rationale for the TEN-T and the
supporting arguments linking infrastructure expansion to job creation, economic growth and regional
development. Moreover, they asserted that the TEN-T contradicts European environmental policy
and the EU’s commitment to creating and maintaining a sustainable transport system. The TENGO
campaign focused on improving the provision for environmental protection measures within
Decision 1692/96/EC (European Communities, 1996), more accurately the legislative proposals
preceding it.(7) The campaign targeted the EU institutions, particularly the European Parliament.
Indeed, the formation of the coalition coincided largely with the Parliament’s consideration (first
reading) of the legislative proposal in May 1995. In general, the Parliament was disposed favourably
to the calls from the environmental groups to augment and improve the environmental protection
measures for the TEN-T guidelines. Of course, there were divisions within and between political
party groups: not everyone shared the position of the socialists and environmentalists. Nevertheless,
the parliamentarians were receptive to the TENGO campaign. 
Following the first reading stage the Council rejected any green amendments from the European
legislature. Against the ensuing inter-institutional disagreement, the TENGO campaign concentrated
on the Parliament during the second reading stage and urged members to re-introduce the
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led to conciliation (since the guidelines legislation followed the co-decision procedure) where the
TENGO coalition continued to lobby European parliamentarians. 
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Article 8 of Decision 1692/96/EC (European Communities, 1996) reveals the (partial) extent to
which the TENGO coalition achieved its policy goals. This is a separate article on environmental
protection. It does not realise fully the coalition’s desire for making a strategic environmental
assessment of the entire network and analyses for particular sections (or corridors) of the TEN-T
obligatory and resolves only to investigate these options further. Some members of the coalition felt
that the efforts of the environmental interest groups had a considerable impact upon the contents of
Article 8. The adoption of the legislative guidelines by the Parliament and Council in July 1996
marked the conclusion of the TENGO campaign and coalition. 
4.1. Characterising the  TENGO coalition 
As a temporary, single-issue forum, TENGO is an example of an AD HOC CAUSE coalition
(Loomis, 1986, p.262). The environmental interest groups recognised the ephemeral nature of the
coalition – a venture restricted to addressing the environmental protection requirements of the
TEN-T. Moreover, the coalition members fit Schlozman and Tierney’s description of “a relatively
homogeneous group of participants who share more than their stake in a particular policy decision”
(1986, p.48). The most striking characteristics of the TENGO coalition are its unofficial status and
flexible organisational structure. In some respects the ‘coalition’ label is misleading because TENGO
is an example of an ad hoc, informally organised effort. Moreover, the appearance of all the names
and logos of the environmental groups on campaign literature was the only evidence of collaboration.
In other words, the groups chose not to create a new, publicly recognisable collaborative organisation
and ‘TENGO’ remained an internal working name. TENGO's organisational structure fits Schlozman
and Tierney’s more usual pattern of collaboration where members “contribute time, professional
help, clerical services, and the like, according to their resources and their stake in the matter at issue”
(1986, p.48). The members of TENGO did not subscribe to the coalition, nor was there a separate
secretariat to co-ordinate the coalition's activities. One of the most noticeable features is the lack of
face-to-face meetings between the member organisations. Instead, the members maintained regular
contact over the telephone and by fax. The organic, piecemeal development of the TENGO coalition
is further confirmation of its informal organisational character. There was a basic division of
responsibilities determined by what each member was interested in, what they were able to
contribute, their geographical proximity to Brussels and Strasbourg, and by their individual actions
on the TEN-T. On the latter point, most members of the coalition continued to act on the TEN-T
outside the coalition. The unofficial, informal nature of TENGO placed no restrictions of external
activities. If members failed to agree on a position within the coalition, they could pursue their
specific agendas and present individual positions outside TENGO. 
The degree of participation within the TENGO coalition varied. No group assumed an overall
leadership role but a core comprising three members contributed more resources. Two members
restricted their contribution more or less to supporting the efforts of the others. As influential
environmental interest groups, the core members welcomed their largely passive support because it
strengthened the TENGO campaign and its ability to influence the legislative guidelines for the
TEN-T (see Hula, 1999, 1995 above). 
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The criteria identified in the literature for differentiating patterns of interest group collaboration are
appropriate for the TENGO coalition. As an AD HOC CAUSE coalition whose members come from
the same policy area, TENGO also reveals a flexible organisational structure. In this respect the
TEN-T case study is representative of the patterns of collaboration in which the European
environmental interest group engage. 
4.2. To what extent do incentives drive collaboration? 
The six members of the TENGO coalition are public interest groups and therefore do not fit neatly
into Olson’s (1971 edition) theory of collective action, which concentrates on the formation of (large)
economic groups. As political advocates environmental interest groups pursue collective goods as
part of their raison d’être. The free-rider problem is surmountable for the leaders of a coalition whose
potential members seek collective goods routinely. Expanding Olson’s (1971 edition) framework to
include different types groups and different types of incentives recognises the importance of
collective goods or collective incentives for potential members of interest group coalitions (Jordan
and Maloney, 1996). For example, an interest group may join a coalition because it perceives
collaboration as offering the best chance of securing political goals (Hula, 1999, 1995). Yet, there
can be no assumption that political actors such as the members of the TENGO coalition will choose
automatically to collaborate simply because free-riding is less of an obstacle. The literature also
identifies several material, solidary and expressive selective incentives available to members of
interest group coalitions (Berry, 1989; Hula, 1999, 1995). This allows for an investigation into the
types of incentive interest groups recognise and to which they respond. In other words, what is the
balance between collective and selective incentives in the membership calculations of interest
groups? Hula (1999, 1995) adds a further dimension to the research on incentives by linking the
levels of participation within interest group coalitions to the combination of incentives that induce
membership. Any insights offered by his model are considered below. The case study reveals the
range of incentives available to the environmental interest groups from membership of the TENGO
coalition, and the extent to which the members were aware of these incentives and responded to
them. 
Hula suggests that groups select collaborative strategies “because they view them as the most
effective way to shape policy outcomes” (1995, p.241). In other words, groups collaborate because
they want to achieve shared public policy goals. Collaboration maximises the opportunities available
to interest groups to influence policy outcomes. Hence, joining an interest group coalition is
explained in part by strategic (collective) incentives (Hula, 1999, 1995). A majority of the members
of the TENGO coalition link collaborative action to influencing opportunities. They indicated that
collaboration strengthened their positions and resulted in an effective strategy for influencing the
legislative guidelines for the TEN-T. 
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When interest groups join a coalition because they wish to pursue public policy goals, the collective
incentive to join is clear – they hope that membership will improve their chances of securing a
collective good. Joining a coalition to influence public policy outcomes also provides groups with an
exclusive opportunity to influence the direction and contents of the coalition’s campaign and the
wider policy debate on the issue (Hula, 1995, pp.244-245). This opportunity is available only to
members. None of the members commented directly on shaping the TENGO campaign. However, it
is important not to dismiss this selective strategic incentive without due consideration because the
environmental groups may take their ability to influence the coalition campaign for granted. It is clear
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the economic arguments supporting the TEN-T, adequate environmental protection provisions in the
legislative guidelines and insistence upon strategic environmental assessment and corridor analysis
reflect the particular interests of the coalition members and indicate their ability to shape the
coalition's platform. One of the members wrote two position papers on behalf of the coalition. This
suggests that this member had an opportunity to advance its interests within the TENGO coalition. Of
course, it is also important to highlight a previous point, namely that four members of the coalition
pursued the TEN-T initiative beyond the collaborative framework. Members could address any issues
not agreed within the coalition on an individual basis. This suggests that the ability to shape the
coalition campaign also depended upon the ability to persuade the other members to adopt particular
ideas and positions. Another member of the TENGO coalition acknowledged another exclusive
strategic benefit from coalition membership. The coalition provided the group with an additional
outlet for its message. By joining, this group seized the opportunity to distribute its position on the
TEN-T to a wider audience. 
Information provides selective incentives to members of interest group coalitions. It is a multifaceted
commodity, which derives material or solidary selective incentives depending upon its properties.
For example, Aspinwall and Greenwood (1998, p.15) differentiate ‘hard’ material information and
‘soft’ social information. The information available to members of a coalition may pertain directly to
the policy goals of the coalition or bear little relation to the activities of the coalition. Information
and information exchange is an important feature of the TENGO coalition. The members met initially
with the intention of establishing a co-ordination network to share information. The environmental
groups sought to improve their knowledge of current legislative developments by pooling their
intelligence. Indeed, one coalition member recalled its need for information on the progress of the
legislative proposal. This group was one of the most active members of the TENGO coalition. Its
information needs confirms the importance of this selective incentive. As the coalition developed the
publications of BirdLife International, Greenpeace and T&E appeared in TENGO campaign literature
indicating the continuing exchange of information (particularly scientific data) among the coalition
members. 
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The environmental groups did not refer directly to exchanging information on matters other than the
TEN-T guidelines. This does not suggest the complete absence of such information; merely that it
does not appear in the case study data. A possible explanation for the high level of issue or goal
related information is the considerable importance placed by the members upon achieving the goals
of the coalition. This provides further confirmation of the importance of collective incentives for
encouraging collaborative behaviour. 
“Coalitions flourish because, ultimately, they are a means of expanding and coordinating the
resources needed for an advocacy effort” (Berry, 1989, p.170). An interest group participates in a
coalition because the coalition affords that member the opportunity to combine its resources with the
other partners. Resource sharing is a further selective incentive. The TENGO case study highlights
the qualitative aspect of this incentive, namely increasing the availability of particular types of
resources where members perceive a deficiency. The case study data also emphasises the range of
resources shared within interest group coalitions. Members shared their subject knowledge and
experience. In addition, several coalition partners have extensive networks of EU institutional and
interest group contacts upon which the less connected could draw. These partners also have lobbying
experience at the EU level. In addition, every group contributed its name and logo to the coalition in
an attempt to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the EU institutions. 
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differed in both quantitative and qualitative terms. For the less active members lending their names
and logos (plus commenting on draft campaign letters and position papers) was often the extent of
their contribution. By contrast, one of the most active members estimated that it devoted
approximately half of its allotted time for the TEN-T to its collaborative work with the TENGO
coalition. 
Although Hula’s (1999, 1995) core, specialist and peripheral model is difficult to apply strictly to
such an informal coalition as TENGO, different levels of participation are evident within the TENGO
coalition – some groups are more active than others. Nevertheless, does this affect the incentives to
which the TENGO partners respond? 
The more active members of the TENGO coalition considered collaboration as an appropriate means
of improving the environmental dimension of the TEN-T guidelines. In other words, they responded
to collective incentives. These members wanted to secure a formidable lobbying position by building
a credible coalition of high profile groups. Indeed, this explains the inclusion of the less active
members. Although one of the less active groups had a high regard for the public policy goals of the
coalition, the least active member made no direct reference to the appropriateness of a collaborative
strategy. If by lending its name and logo to the coalition (whose public policy goals it supported) the
least active group was making a gesture to the other TENGO partners, this would fall within Hula’s
(1999, 1995) definition of a symbolic benefit from collaborating. While resource contributions
differed, most members acknowledged the (selective) benefits of sharing (particularly information) –
even one of the most active groups identified resources in which it was lacking. 
16
4.3. To what extent do coalition partners drive collaboration? 
Berry (1989) suggests that groups usually identify coalition partners from within their particular
policy area. The basis for this argument is the assumption that groups from the same policy area learn
to trust each other through regular contact. In essence, like-minded groups are “regular allies” (Berry,
1989, p.168) with the ability to work together ad infinitum. The ephemeral nature of the TENGO
coalition makes it rather difficult to reflect upon Berry’s (1989) argument other than to note that in
the case of the coalition the members come from the same policy area. 
Beyond the case study, there is a wider point to make regarding the potential for like-minded groups
to collaborate as a matter of routine. Long suggests that the environmental interest groups can “work
together on the basis of highest common factor principles” (1998, p.117) because they strive for a
common fundamental goal, namely the protection of the environment. While no guarantee of
collaborative outcomes, shared goals create a favourable backdrop to collective action. For
collaborative experience (Hojnacki, 1997), BirdLife International, FoEE, T&E and WWF engage in
more enduring patterns of collaboration, including the G-8. Several groups describe it as the most
important collaborative forum. In addition, some of the members of the TENGO coalition referred to
other issue-based collaborative fora involving the European environmental groups. Yet, collaboration
accounts for a relatively small proportion of the action undertaken by the European environmental
groups. Moreover, when they engage in collaboration their preference is for issue-based, informally
organised coalitions (exemplified by the G-8).(8) 
There are several constraints upon collective action suggesting why collaboration is only one aspect
of their work and explaining the popularity of this particular pattern. For example, the European
environmental groups compete over funding from the EU institutions, notably the Commission
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at the EU level despite their “unwritten and even an unspoken agreement among the Brussels-based
environmental groups to specalize in different areas of activity” (Long, 1995, p.674). In this respect
they resemble their industry counterparts and vie for market share (Mazey and Richardson, 1993).
The European environmental groups come from different political traditions (Biliouri, 1999) and
favour different policy or lobbying styles (Mazey and Richardson, 1993; Rucht, 1993). While some
groups prefer to work within the limits of the EU policy process, others favour the direct action
approach. Consequently, the groups have different strategic preferences or means for pursuing public
policy goals. Although the environmental interest groups share the same common goal of
environmental protection, they often pursue it in different ways. Strategic preferences have an
enduring quality because routine choices often become embedded. More than this, other actors
(institutional and interest group) tend to associate groups with their usual tactics. The contrasting
styles of the EEB and Greenpeace illustrate the differences - the former displays the attributes of an
'insider' group (working within the limits of the EU policy process) and the latter those of an
'outsider' group (pursuing goals by direct action). Both have much to defend regarding their lobbying
styles. However, contrasting preferences may constrain collaboration, particularly formally
organised, publicly recognised coalitions. While a broader perspective on relations between the
European environmental groups highlights the considerable potential for collaboration between
like-minded organisations, it also identifies differences between the groups. Differences do not
prohibit collaboration per se; after all, they can be advantageous in a collaborative context
(Greenwood, 1997). Nevertheless, they may explain why collaboration is not a routine phenomenon
and the European environmental groups’ penchant for informal coalitions such as TENGO. 
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4.4. To what extent does the issue drive collaboration? 
The literature identifies a number of points concerning issues and interest group collaboration. Berry
suggests that groups tend to work alone on priority issues and collaborate on issues of lesser
importance or issues they would not wish to address individually (1989, p.166). Section 4.2 confirms
the importance of the issue to a majority of the TENGO members. What is striking about the
members of the TENGO coalition, regardless of their level of participation, is their recognition of the
(collective) strategic benefits which derive from collaboration and, by implication, their regard for
improving the environmental protection measures in the TEN-T guidelines. Although this appears at
first to contradict Berry’s (1989) argument that groups act alone of priority issues, four of the six
members continued to act individually and in concert outside the TENGO coalition. This indicates
their commitment to pursuing an issue of considerable importance. Some coalition partners
addressed aspects of the TEN-T that were not included within the parameters of the TENGO
campaign, for example, actions against specific transport links, which form part of the TEN-T. They
combined collaborative and individual action to address the issue comprehensively. 
Loomis suggests “Sometimes the mere complexity of an issue may dictate cooperation” (1986,
p.267). Interests who feel unable to address such issues alone will seek to pursue them collectively.
To what extent is the TEN-T a complex, multi-faceted issue? The environmental groups focused
upon the environmental dimension of the TEN-T. An understanding of the economic dimension of
the TEN-T is required to address the environmental dimension comprehensively. The environmental
dimension involves technical, scientific and detailed arguments about the correlation between
economic development transport infrastructure and sustainable mobility. It includes discussion of
environmental protection mechanisms such as strategic environmental assessment and corridor
analysis. 
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formation of the coalition and continued after joining. Each approached the issue according to its
particular interests. The following publications indicate the level of economic, technical and
scientific understanding of the issue within the TENGO coalition. BirdLife International’s study on
The impact of trans-European networks on nature conservation: a pilot project (Bina, Briggs and
Bunting, 1995) ascertains and quantifies the impact of the TEN-T upon important bird areas. The
study indicates the environmental benefits of a planning process that includes strategic environmental
assessment (Bina, Briggs and Bunting, 1995, p.5). A joint study by BirdLife International, T&E and
Greenpeace on Strategic environmental assessment and corridor analysis of trans-European
transport networks: a position paper (BirdLife International, European Federation for Transport and
Environment (T&E) and Greenpeace, 1996) enabled the members to advance further the need for
both types of analysis for the TEN-T. The members used these and other studies on transport and
regional development as lobbying tools to bring the environmental protection issues to the attention
of the EU institutions (see for example, Greenpeace, 1995). From the expertise gathered before the
formation of the TENGO coalition the evidence suggests that the environmental groups did not
collaborate because of the complex nature of the issue. 
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Loomis contends that coalitions help to extend or diminish the amount of “public attention an issue
will receive” (1986, p.267). Indeed, “the extent of public attention an issue receives frequently
depends on the ability of interest groups to make the issue accessible, and important, to the
appropriate constituencies” (Loomis, 1986, p.268). Collaborative action to alter the level of public
attention an issue receives has a strong strategic component. The members do not refer directly to
extending public attention on the TEN-T. However, a number of points support Loomis’ (1986)
argument. The environmental dimension of the TEN-T was not addressed fully at the EU level until
the European Parliament’s first reading of the legislative proposal in May 1995. The coalition
focused its campaign on the EU institutions, particularly the European Parliament, to draw attention
to the environmental protection requirements for the TEN-T. Press conferences and demonstrations
such as those staged for the European Parliament’s first reading during the plenary session in May
1995 brought wider attention to the TEN-T. One of the members commented upon the TENGO
campaign’s favourable reception from the media. Furthermore, the coalition members also
encouraged a Europe-wide campaign on the TEN-T involving organisations at the national level.
Examining Loomis’ (1986) issue scope argument reveals additional insights into the actions of the
TENGO coalition and the nature of the TENGO campaign 
4.5. To what extent do opposition interests drive collaboration? 
Hojnacki (1997) suggests that groups are more receptive to collaboration when they perceive an
organised opposition. A number of business and industry groups, including the European Round
Table of Industrialists (ERT), were involved in the development of the TEN-T master plans. These
groups supported the economic arguments for an integrated Europe-wide transport network. As noted
above, Commission documents explain how a trans-European infrastructure system is essential for
the effective operation of the Single European Market and how it will promote economic growth and
employment throughout the EU. The business and industry organisations acted before the formation
of the TENGO coalition and either reduced their involvement or ceased to be involved altogether
after the Commission adopted the initial legislative proposal for the TEN-T guidelines. This contrasts
with the active phase of the TENGO coalition when the Council and European Parliament were
considering the proposal. The TENGO partners do not refer directly to the role of business and
industry groups in their decision to collaborate. However, the involvement of business and industry
representatives at the agenda setting and policy formulation stage may have galvanised the
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positions of the TENGO members than evidence or confirmation from these groups. Nevertheless, it
is plausible to argue that opposing interests need not act simultaneously to influence collaborative
behaviour. If this is the case, it is possible to interpret the actions of the European environmental
groups as the response of relative 'outsider' interests to the 'insider' actions of the ERT and its
contemporaries. 
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Evidence suggesting the manner in which the organised opposition influenced the actions of the
TENGO coalition is more compelling. The groups decided to speak with one voice. In other words,
the coalition did not have an official name (or status) but the members made joint statements bearing
the six names and logos. According to one TENGO partner, the issue and the lack of active
opposition influenced the decision to use a collective voice. The environmental groups were not
obliged to counter lobby separately to match the volume of dissenting voice because the organised
opposition was less active during the legislative process. Instead, the TENGO members were free to
speak collectively if they wished. 
4.6. To what extent do institutions drive collaboration? 
Walker (1991) identifies the role of patrons in the origins and maintenance of interest groups. Patrons
include inter alia government agencies and, in essence, patrons offer financial and organisational
support to groups. There is no evidence in the case study data that the formal EU institutions
contributed directly to the development of the TENGO coalition or encouraged consciously the
environmental interest groups to collaborate over the TEN-T legislative guidelines. 
The evidence is similarly scarce regarding the influence of the institutions in the new institutionalist
sense (see Bulmer's (1998) definition above) on the TENGO partners. One member of the coalition
suggested that the lack of transparency surrounding the progress of the legislative proposal
stimulated the initial discussion between the six environmental groups from which the TENGO
coalition emerged. Another member commented on the conflict between the Council of Ministers
and European Parliament over the environmental protection requirements within the legislative
guidelines. Successive amendments to the original legislative proposal for the TEN-T guidelines
made issue tracking difficult. Based on this (limited) evidence, it appears that the uncertainty created
by the institutional intransparency surrounding the development and progress of the legislative
guidelines may have encouraged the environmental groups to exchange information. This in turn led
to collaboration. Such an explanation concurs with the new institutionalist approach where formal
and informal institutions structure political interaction. Indeed, this example highlights the potential
influence of the policy and legislative process (particularly the co-decision procedure) on interest
group behaviour. It is clear that any institutional influence on collaborative behaviour of the TENGO
partners was of an indirect nature; the empirical evidence suggests that the EU institutions did not
create opportunities or actively promote collaboration between the environmental interest groups.
However, a new institutionalist interpretation would emphasise the importance of the circumstances
created by the EU institutions as a potential influence upon collaborative behaviour. Collaboration
may then appear as a response to developments within the institutional landscape. The lack of
transparency created by the EU institutions over the TEN-T guidelines lends credence to a new
institutionalist interpretation, although as indicated in section three there is no sense in which the
case study can be regarded as a contribution to the debate about the types of historical, rational
choice or sociological institutional influences at work. 
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The case study data reveal some evidence of institutional influence upon the activities of the TENGO
coalition. For example, the European Parliament provided the institutional focus for the TENGO
campaign not least because the formation of the coalition coincided with the Parliament’s
consideration of the legislative proposal. The rapporteur for the proposal on the legislative guidelines
responded favourably to the TENGO coalition. Likewise, the parliamentarians praised the campaign's
clear position on a complex issue. This suggests that the favourable response of the Parliament and
the timing of the coalition influenced its campaigning activities. 
5. Conclusions 
The case study reveals a particular pattern of collaboration, namely an informally organised,
unofficial coalition in which the names of the European environmental groups were publicised and
the members decided how much or how little they would contribute to the coalition. 
The literary framework identifies a number of factors with the potential to drive interest group
collaboration - incentives, coalition partners, issues, opposition interests and institutions. Evidence
from case study of the TENGO coalition points to the importance of incentives and issues upon the
behaviour of the European environmental interest groups. There is a clear link between collective
incentives and issue importance since a majority of TENGO members recognised collaboration as an
appropriate strategy for improving the environmental dimension of the TEN-T guidelines. Four
groups pursued dual strategies of influence (combining individual and collaborative action). Their
external activities confirm the priority status of the issue. The range of selective incentives
recognised by the TENGO members similarly confirms the importance of collaborating to achieve
public policy goals. For example, the information exchanged within the coalition related to the goals
of the coalition and the resources contributed to the coalition indicate the members’ desire to
improve the TEN-T guidelines. 
The collective action literature identifies the importance of incentives for encouraging collaboration
by asking the researcher to look beyond the more obvious explanation for collaborative behaviour,
namely that shared goals equal coalition strategies. It is hardly surprising that collective strategic
incentives appeal to the environmental groups given their political advocacy role. Besides routinely
pursuing public policy goals, several members of the TENGO coalition have considerable
collaborative experience (through the G-8 and other fora). Consequently, they are aware of potential
coalition partners and are capable of pursuing collaboration with like-minded groups. These factors
create a favourable backdrop to collaboration. Nevertheless, collaboration is not an everyday
phenomenon for the European environmental groups and when they act collectively they favour
informally organised coalitions. A number of potential constraints upon collaboration highlight the
differences between the environmental interest groups. Competition over funding, contrasting
strategic preferences and the desire to achieve public policy goals on an individual basis may explain
the popularity of coalitions that do not constrain external activities. 
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Beyond incentives, allies and issues, the case study presents less evidence of opposition and
institutional influences upon collaborative behaviour. There is little evidence to suggest that
perceptions of an organised opposition influenced the TENGO partners’ decision to collaborate.
However, it is possible to interpret the creation of the coalition as the partners' reaction to the agenda
setting role of the ERT and other business and industry groups. If this is view is accepted, the
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simultaneous action. Regarding the timing of opposition action, the case study evidence suggests that
the lack of a simultaneous organised opposition influenced TENGO’s campaign strategy. 
The only evidence of institutional influence upon the decision to collaborate is the lack of
transparency surrounding the development of legislative proposal for the TEN-T guidelines and
amendments to the proposal. One member expressed its inability to find out about the progress of the
proposal due in part to the inter-institutional debate surrounding aspects of the TEN-T guidelines.
The case study confirms the appropriateness of using basic ideas from the new institutionalism
literature to investigate patterns of collaboration. It emphasises the importance of an encompassing
institutional definition since there was no evidence to suggest that the formal EU institutions had any
direct influence upon the collaborative behaviour of the environmental interest groups. 
The paper examines a phenomenon that had not been the subject of extensive empirical research. The
case study identifies a specific pattern of informal collaboration. It also demonstrates the applicability
of a range of ideas to an investigation of how and why European environmental interest groups
collaborate. Each factor is worthy of further empirical investigation, particularly the presence of
opposition interests and the impact of the EU institutional framework. The factors considered in this
paper divide into two categories, internal (or group related) factors and external (or environmental)
factors. Incentives (collective and selective) are an internal factor and contribute to an explanation of
what drives collaboration at the EU level. Indeed, the literature and empirical case study findings
confirm their importance. How groups relate to possible coalition partners, behave when faced with
opposition, and manage their institutional environment are potentially no less important.
Nevertheless, these external factors require further research to establish their explanatory value,
including the introduction of a more sophisticated methodology to investigate fully the institutional
influences upon collaborative behaviour. Future research should concentrate on developing and
combining these internal and external factors to explain collaborative behaviour by interest groups at
the EU level. 
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Endnotes 
(*) The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments by the two anonymous referees of
the EIoP.
(1) The Group of Eight (G-8) is the collective name for the main environmental interest groups with
a permanent presence in Brussels. The members are the European Environmental Bureau (EEB),
Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), Greenpeace International, Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF),
Climate Network Europe (CNE), BirdLife International, the European Federation for Transport and
Environment (T&E) and The World Conservation Union (Biliouri, 1999). 
(2) The G-8 coalition confirms the universal applicability of the criteria. It is an enduring coalition of
same sector members. It addresses many environmental issues and maintains its informal
organisational arrangements. 
(3) Olson (1971 edition) tends to rely upon the self-interested aspect of rational behaviour. However,
he suggests that rational action does not equate necessarily with self-interested action. The behaviour
of individuals may also be rational “in the sense that their objectives, whether selfish or unselfish,
should be pursued by means that are efficient and effective for achieving these objectives” (Olson,
1971 edition, p.65). 
(4) Symbolic participation is tied to the issue of interest group maintenance (Hula, 1995,
pp.248-249). 
(5) This case study is part of a larger project investigating patterns of interest group collaboration
involving the European environmental interest groups. Interviews conducted in 1996 with interest
group and institutional actors generated valuable data regarding how and why groups collaborate. 
(6) EU policy and legislation to combat motor vehicle emissions (specifically the preparations for
setting emission standards and related measures for the year 2000) is the other case study in the
project. The case study issues were selected because they met the criteria and exhibited a number of
contrasting features. Whereas the TEN-T is a new issue, vehicle emission standards have been
determined at the European level since 1970. Initially the patterns of collaboration in the two cases
appeared to be rather different regarding their membership composition and public status. However,
further investigation revealed considerable similarities in terms of the informal organisational
character of the coalitions. 
(7) Although the TENGO campaign concentrated on the development of the TEN-T at the European
level, it is important to note that several coalition members were also active at the national level
where Decision 1692/96/EC (European Communities, 1996) will be implemented. 
(8) Data collected during preliminary interviews with environmental interest groups in Brussels in
June 1995. 
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